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Summary 
Although the business model of the pharmaceutical industry in Japan has shifted to open 
innovation, which allows domestic biotech ventures to explore external opportunities and thus increase 
their presence, the number of the biotech venture initial public offerings (IPOs) or mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) by major pharmaceutical companies in Japan is comparatively less than in the United 
States. 
The existing literature shows that a venture finance environment has been established in the 
United States, which includes the following characteristics: 1) government funded support programs 
shows a negative effect on IPOs since they invest in high-risk projects that are too risky for other 
investors to invest in, 2) the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) invests in profitable small 
companies with sufficient cash flow, which expects a high return on investment within five years after 
establishment, 3) biotech ventures with a high proportion of investment by independent Venture Capitals 
(VCs) at the seed round are likely to merge or be acquired by a pharmaceutical company given the weak 
stock market condition which results in independent VCs choosing M&A as the preferred exit strategy, 
and 4) the total investment amount and an alliance with a pharmaceutical company after the IT bubble 
shows a positive effect on IPOs and M&A. Moreover, the macroeconomic trend indicates that 
deregulation of cloud funding of ventures by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), which 
  
was a law that passed in 2012, boosted biotech venture IPOs in the United States. Thus, I conclude that 
there are success factors for biotech ventures that exist in the United States, but not in Japan.  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate differences between the United States and Japan 
on the success factors for biotech ventures from a financing and alliance formation perspective using a 
logistic regression analysis. 
My findings show that, 1) out-licensing is the strongest factor to lead biotech ventures to an IPO 
in Japan as well as in the United States, 2) in contrast with the Unite States, the total funding amount has 
no significant effect on an IPO of biotech ventures in Japan since increasing the number of investment 
rounds and VCs does not increase their market capitalization and thus does not motivate biotech ventures 
to go public, 3) Japanese government programs do not invest in biotech ventures whose risks are too high 
for other investors to invest in, and instead invest in ventures that have a high probability of return on 
investments within five years after establishment. On the other hand, SBIC invests in high risk companies, 
which was in contrast to the United States, 4) VCs invest in biotech ventures sometime after the seed 
round, however there is no significant difference in the exit strategy of biotech ventures, and 5) biotech 
ventures established after 2007 are less likely to go public. 
Based on the study results, I conclude that the post-IPO financing environment in Japan is weak 
even though there are delisting criteria on sales and corporate performance that hinder IPOs at the early 
development stage. To accelerate the development of the most advanced therapeutic drugs in Japan, the 
study recommends developing a post-IPO financing environment in Japan that encourages biotech 
ventures to go public earlier and raise required funds through an IPO, which may speed up the 
development of innovative drugs. 
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CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND 
SECTION 1. THE PREVIOUS BUSINESS MODEL OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
For years, a model of closed innovation was implemented to deliver new ideas to market in 
successful pharmaceutical companies. This involved investing more heavily in internal research and 
development (R&D) than their competitors, and hiring qualified scientists who were likely to 
develop successful products. This, in turn, allowed these companies to get their products to the 
market first, whose revenues were protected by intellectual property laws.  
Large pharmaceutical companies spend 17.8%
(1)
 of their sales on R&D, which enables some 
of their products to grow to a “blockbuster” that could generate annual sales of at least $1 billion. 
Companies would reinvest profits in R&D, which could lead to additional breakthrough medicines. 
This created a virtuous cycle of innovation. 
SECTION 2. THE CURRENT BUSINESS MODEL OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
The Pharmaceutical Industry Vision 2013
(2)
 and the Health labor white paper 2017,
(3)
 state 
that due to modern drug discovery approaches based on advances in science and technology, more 
precise safety and efficacy data are required to obtain pharmaceutical approval from the health 
authority compared to before. Therefore, the overall success rate has decreased to only 0.0036% and 
the development period has lengthened to 9 to 17 years. 
Increasing healthcare expenses have also affected changes in business models. To reduce 
medical expenses, the focus of healthcare has shifted to areas such as 1) personalized medicine, a 
therapy based on genetic polymorphism information such as disease susceptibility and drug 
susceptibility using human genome information, and 2) precision medicine initiative, an emerging 
approach for disease treatment and prevention that considers individual variability in genes, 
environment, and lifestyle for each subgrouping of diseases. The concept of precision medicine is 
expected to develop drugs with a higher efficacy for each specific person/disease sub-group, and 
prevent an increase in medical costs by improving the sales method and distribution routes.   
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It is essential for pharmaceutical companies to change their conventional business models to 
develop “blockbusters,” and invest in advancing open innovation to expand a company’s pipelines 
and shape the future of their industry.  
SECTION 3. THE CURRENT BUSINESS MODEL OF BIOTECH VENTURES 
The first step in the domestic biotech venture’s business model is for universities or public 
research institutes, etc. to obtain a patent for a promising innovative technology/idea using a 
Technology Licensing Organization (TLO), and transfer it to a biotech venture to advance research. 
Generally, seed round founding comes from grants, entrepreneurs, and angel investors to 
support early stage of biotechnology development. Venture capitals (VCs) usually invest at the 
Series A round or later, and pharmaceutical companies sign off out-license or research collaboration 
agreements to provide funds to support R&D until the launch of products or services.  
Research collaboration agreements provide biotech ventures with a performance fee based 
on the progress of development milestone. Additionally, an out-license agreement provide a 
pharmaceutical company with a right to develop products utilizing their technology, allows to take 
over the development in their companies, and provide biotech ventures with royalty payments after 
the product launch if the development succeeds. This academia-industry collaboration has become 
the business model of current biotech ventures. 
SECTION 4. CURRENT PROBLEMS FACED BY BIOTECH VENTURES 
Many large pharmaceutical companies are currently transitioning from closed to open 
innovation business models.  
According to Chesbrough (2003),
(4)
 in an open innovation business model, firms 
commercialize external (as well as internal) ideas by deploying external (as well as in-house) 
pathways to the market. Some vehicles for accomplishing this include startup companies that may 
be financed and staffed with some of the company’s own personnel and licensing agreements.  
This open innovation trend allows domestic biotech ventures to expand external 
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opportunities (e.g., milestone payments, alliances including research collaboration and licensing out 
of seeds compound, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A)), increases the importance of the role of 
biotech ventures, and has a positive influence on the success of domestic biotech ventures. 
In this section, I review the current situation of the exit strategy of biotech ventures in Japan 
focusing on 1) the number of biotech ventures, 2) the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of 
biotech ventures, 3) the trend in M&A transaction amounts and transaction numbers, and 4) 
collaboration between industry and biotech venture/university.  
1.4.1. Number of biotech ventures 
Japan Bioindustry Association (JBA) conducts an annual survey of domestic biotech venture 
companies, and issues the annual Bio Venture Statistics Survey Report. This report defines a biotech 
venture as a company that meets the following three criteria. 
 
1. Companies that conduct business by utilizing "biotechnology" defined by the Japan Industry 
Standard (JIS) K 3600: 2000 listed below. 
Definition of "biotechnology" 
In a narrow sense, gene recombination technology and its peripheral technology. In a broad 
sense, technology that is used or applied for living things or their functions. Conventional 
fermentation technology, breeding technology, genetic recombination technology, enzyme 
engineering technology, cell engineering technology, development engineering technology and 
protein engineering technology etc. are included. 
2. Companies whose number of regular employees is 300 or less according to the definition by the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. 
3. Companies that have been in operation for less than 20 years according to the definition by the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. 
According to Bio Venture Statistics Survey Report of 2015,
(5)
 many biotech ventures have 
been established since around 2000 in Japan. However, the number of biotech ventures started to 
stagnate from 2007. (Figure 1)  
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The Bio-innovation study report (2010)
(6)
 showed that the number of domestic biotech 
venture is smaller than those for Western countries, and only 2.3% of biotech ventures went public, 
compared to 34.6% for the United States and 11.6% for EU countries, which shows the difficulty of 
going public for biotech ventures in Japan.  
 
Figure 1                                             
 
 Source: Bio Venture Statistics Survey of 2015 (JBA) 
Figure 2      
 
Source: Ernst & Young Global Biotechnology Report 2008 and 
Bio Venture Statistics Survey of 2007 (JBA) 
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1.4.2. Number of IPOs of biotech ventures 
Figure 3 shows the trend in the total number of IPOs of domestic biotech ventures. Four 
companies went public in 2011 and 2013, but only one company did so in 2016 and 2017, 
respectively.  
Figure 3 
 
Source: entrepedia 
 
On the other hand, according to the Ernst & Young Global Biotechnology Report 2017 
(Figure 4),
(7)
 the total number of IPOs in the United States increased since the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) became law in 2012. The JOBS Act accomplished the following: 
1) it gave companies with an annual gross income of less than $ 1 billion at IPO a five year grace 
period to comply with full securities regulations, and reduced the regulatory cost burden of being a 
public company, 2) relaxed procedural restrictions on research reports between emerging growth 
companies and investors prior to an IPO, and 3) allowed the acquisition of funding through online 
portals from non-accredited investors, which roughly accounts for 97 percent of the population in 
the United States.
(8) 
As a result, capital raised in IPOs and number of deals achieved a new record in 
2014; about $5 billion was raised for around 75 public biotech ventures. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
m
p
an
y
 
Japan biotechnology IPOs by year 
All IPO (n=37)
6 
 
Among the 31 US and European biotech ventures that were launched in 2016, 18 biotech 
ventures priced their IPOs within their anticipated ranges and 13 priced below. No biotech venture 
priced above the expected range. This trend caused the downward trend of IPOs in Japan. (Figure 5) 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: Ernst & Young Global Biotechnology Report (2017) 
Figure 5 
 Source: Ernst & Young Global Biotechnology Report (2017) 
1.4.3. Trends in M&A transaction amounts and numbers 
As another exit strategy for biotech ventures, Figure 6 shows trends in M&A transactions 
between 2009 and 2015 and global M&A transaction amounts, which exceeded $6 billion in 2015 in 
the United States. In Japan, the amount was only around $10 million, which indicates that M&A 
may not be an attractive exit strategy.  
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Figure 6 
 
Source: "15th Industry Eye,” Deloitte Tohmatsu Financial Advisory LLC (9) 
Note: Target companies are private company only.  
1.4.4. Investment amounts for venture companies 
The Venture Enterprise Center YEARBOOK 2016
(10)
 presents the investment amounts for 
venture companies in the four regions of the United States, Europe, China, and Japan between 2011 
and 2015 (Figure 7). 
Investment amounts in the United States have been increasing year by year and it was the 
highest in 2015 in the past five years with more than 7 trillion yen. In contrast, the amount of 
investment in Japan in the past five years has remained flat, and was less than 2% of the amount in 
the United States. 
With regards to the number of invested biotech companies, the figure increased dramatically 
in China from 2013, becoming 77% of that of the United States in 2015. On the other hand, the 
figure in Japan is about 20% of that in the United States, and has been nearly flat for the past five 
years.  
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Figure 7 
 
 
Source: Venture Enterprise Center YEARBOOK 2016 
 
1.4.5. Collaboration between industry and domestic biotech ventures/universities 
Figure 8 shows the breakdown of the origins of ideas introduced to pharmaceutical 
companies in Japan. More than 40% of the ideas of domestic projects came from overseas 
pharmaceutical companies that did not have a sufficient development and sales base in Japan. On 
the other hand, the introduction from domestic research institutions, universities, and ventures was 
less than 5%, which is an extremely low level. 
Moreover, the figure shows that ideas for some overseas projects had been introduced from 
domestic companies that would like to expand their development and sales base globally. However, 
there was no introduction from domestic research institutions, universities, or ventures.  
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Figure 8 
 
Source: T. Yagi, M. Ohkubo (2013) (11)  
SECTION 5. SUMMARY 
Although the business model of the pharmaceutical industry has shifted to open innovation, 
the out-licensing from domestic research institutions, universities, and ventures to pharmaceutical 
companies has been less than 5%, and the number of biotech venture IPOs and M&A by major 
pharmaceutical companies is much less than that in the United States.  
There is no policy support in Japan to encourage biotech ventures to go public, such as 
relaxation of funding regulation for emerging growth companies (e.g., JOBS Act in the United 
States). Thus, I conclude that there are some success factors that exist in the United States, but not in 
Japan.  
The success factors for US biotech ventures are reviewed in Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 and 4 
investigate that for Japanese biotech ventures. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I review the literature to explore success factors for US biotech 
ventures.  
SECTION 1. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ON SUCCESS FACTORS FOR BIOTECH 
VENTURES IN THE UNITED STATES (MIYAKE ET AL., 2010) 
2.1.1. Research question 
 Miyake et al. (2010)
(12) 
found that there were less domestic biotech ventures that went 
public or were acquired or merged in Japan compared to the United States. He identifies the success 
factors for bio ventures in the United States, in particular focusing on aspects around finance and 
alliance formation. 
He conducted a quantitative analysis on 1,046 US biotech ventures that had been in 
operation for less than 20 years from the 1960s to 2009 to explore success factors for US biotech 
ventures.  
The companies that were studied conducted business by utilizing "biotechnology." 
Specifically, it included the following industries. 
− Medical/health: Medical or diagnostic. 
− Medical device: Veterinary pharmaceutical, medical equipment, diagnostic equipment, 
cell therapy, or regenerative medicine. 
− Platform company: Genetic engineering technology, gene analysis technology, protein 
analysis technology, or nano biotechnology 
− Others: Analytical instrument, bioinformatics, commissioned research, microorganism, 
enzyme, bio chemicals, laboratory equipment, or experimental reagents. 
− Agriculture/food: Agriculture or food.  
− Environment/energy: Environment or energy. 
− Service: Think tank or consulting. 
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2.1.2. Research design 
In this study, the definition of success for biotech ventures was defined as the following, and 
was used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis. 
 Success outcome 1: Biotech venture has gone public. 
 Success outcome 2: Biotech venture went public within five years after establishment. 
 Success outcome 3: Biotech venture merged or was acquired. 
 
As independent variables, the following variables were used: establishment year (START), 
the total financing amount before exit (FINANCE), investment ratio of an independent VC in seed 
stage (SEED_PE), presence of investment by a VC affiliated with a bank in expansion/later stage 
(BANK_dummy), proportion of funds raised during the IT bubble period in the pre-exit finance 
amount (%_finance_99_01), presence of funding by the small business investment company (SBIC) 
(SBIC_dummy), presence of funding by a government support program (GOV_dummy), financing 
amount from an alliance before exit (ALLIANCE), presence of an alliance with major 
pharmaceutical companies before achieving proof of concept (POC) (MEGAPHARMA_dummy), 
existence of an alliance during the IT bubble period (alliance_99_01_dummy), and existence of an 
alliance after the IT bubble (alliance_02_05_dummy). 
2.1.3. Data source, analysis, and statistical techniques  
Logistic regression analysis using the maximum likelihood method was carried out using 
data from Recap’s Biotech Alliance Database of VentureXpert and Recombinant capital, which are a 
database of the Thomson Financial Company in the United States. 
2.1.4. Study results and discussion  
Table 1 shows the results of the regression analysis regarding success outcomes 1, 2, and 3.  
 
Success outcomes 1 and 2 
The foundation year in both success outcomes 1 and 2 was negatively significant at the 1% 
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level. This implies that it has been difficult to go public in recent years. As described in Section 2 of 
Chapter 1, difficulty in developing new drugs increased, and an IPO was less likely to be selected as 
an exit strategy due to weak market conditions.  
The total financing amount before IPO was positively significant at the 1% level in success 
outcome 1 since large amounts of financing allowed biotech ventures to carry out R&D activities 
without budgetary restrictions, and led to going public as a means to raise greater financing for 
further development. However, it did not lead to going public within five years from establishment.  
In addition, the presence of a government funding support program was negatively 
significant at the 5% level for success outcomes 1 and 2, which suggests that government programs 
in the United States invested in high-risk projects that were too risky for other investors to invest in 
(e.g., very early seed stage). 
On the other hand, the presence of funding by SBIC was positively significant positive at 
the 5% level for success outcome 2 since it invested in profitable companies with sufficient cash 
flow to generate a positive return on investments. SBIC was established to encourage the 
management of small businesses and the role of SBIC on venture finance was different from the 
government support program. 
Finally, an alliance with a pharmaceutical company after the IT bubble showed a positive 
effect for success outcome 1 since alliances partners invested in biotech ventures that had high 
potential technology. Investments from alliance partners allowed biotech ventures to carry out R&D 
without budgetary restrictions increasing the probability for biotech ventures to go public. 
 
Success outcome 3 
The foundation year was negatively significant at the 1% level, which shows the difficulty 
of biotech ventures to merge or be acquired in recent years given the increased complexity of 
developing new drugs.  
Investment from independent VCs at the seed round was positively significant positive at 
the 5% level. This result shows that hands-on support from independent VCs at an early stage had a 
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positive influence on the success of product development, and that VCs preferred M&A to an IPO as 
the exit strategy considering weak market conditions.  
An alliance with pharmaceutical companies after the IT bubble was positively significant at 
the 1% level since alliance partners invested in biotech ventures with high potential technology. 
Investment from alliance partners allowed biotech ventures to carry out sufficient R&D increasing 
the probability for biotech ventures to merge or be acquired by a pharmaceutical company. 
 
Table 1  The results of the regression analysis 
  Success 1  Success 2  Success 3  
Biotech venture has 
gone public.  
Biotech venture 
went public within 
five years after 
establishment. 
Biotech venture 
merged or was 
acquired. 
START 
-572.78 -312.95 -330.42 
(-8.45)*** (-4.16)*** (-5.02)*** 
FINANCE 
0.47 0.16 0.04 
(3.75)*** (1.24) (0.31) 
SEED_PE 
0.12 0.34 0.79 
(0.37) (0.93) (2.47)** 
BANK_dummy 
-0.01 -0.91 - 
(-0.03) (-2.37)** - 
%_finance_99_01 
-0.48 -0.61 1.05 
(-0.95) (0.94) (2.50)** 
GOV_dummy 
-1.16 -2.39 -0.61 
(-2.43)** (-2.21)** (-1.23) 
SBIC_dummy 
0.61 1.76 0.03 
(0.69) (1.99)** (0.02) 
ALLIANCE 
0.21 0.15 0.05 
(2.88)*** (1.81)* (0.52) 
MEGAPHARMA_dummy 
-0.13 -0.24 0.02 
(-0.33) (-0.53) (0.05) 
alliance_99_01_dummy -0.25 0.34 -0.38 
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(-0.75) (0.91) (-0.72) 
alliance_02_05_dummy 
0.69 0.21 1.19 
(2.07)** (-0.55) (3.24)*** 
CONS 
4350.29 2376.00 2509.13 
(8.44)*** (4.16)*** (5.02)*** 
Source: Miyake et al. (2010) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
SECTION 2. SUMMARY 
The total amount of finance and an alliance with a pharmaceutical company after the IT 
bubble showed a positive effect on both IPO and M&A since they allowed biotech ventures to carry 
out R&D without budget restrictions, increasing the probability for biotech ventures to go public, 
merge, or be acquired. Moreover, results indicated that SBIC invested in profitable companies with 
sufficient cash flow with an expected positive return on investment within five years after 
establishment.  
On the other hand, government funding support programs negatively affected IPOs since 
they invested in high-risk projects that were too risky for other investors to invest in (e.g., very early 
seed stage). 
Finally, biotech ventures that had a high proportion of investments by independent VCs at 
the seed round was likely to merge or be acquired by a pharmaceutical company due to weak stock 
market conditions, which resulted in independent VCs choosing M&A as the preferred exit strategy. 
In the United States, the data indicates that a venture finance environment has been 
established.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the method used in this study. It describes the research questions, 
research hypotheses, research design, data source, research population, data analysis, and statistical 
techniques used in the study. 
SECTION 1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Pharmaceutical companies are currently transitioning from closed to open innovation 
systems, which allow domestic biotech ventures to expand external opportunities. This is expected 
to positively influence the exit strategy of domestic biotech ventures. However, there was only one 
IPO by domestic biotech ventures in 2016 and 2017, respectively, and there were only a few cases 
where domestic biotech ventures were acquired in the past seven years, which indicates that the 
trend of open innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has not resulted in increased IPOs or M&As 
compared to the United States. (Figure 11and Figure 12) Thus, the following hypothesis is set forth. 
Hypothesis 
There are success factors for biotech ventures that exist in the United States, but not in Japan. 
 
In this study, I explore the differences between the United States and Japan in the success 
factors for biotech ventures in terms of financing and alliance formation using a logistic regression 
analysis.  
SECTION 2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study was designed to study the research question referred to in Section 1. The 
dependent and independent variables are presented below. Since the number of domestic biotech 
ventures that were acquired
 
by a pharmaceutical company, or achieved IPO within five years after 
establishment was small, we studied the success factors that led domestic companies to an IPO, IPO 
within five years after establishment, and M&A. 
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We removed the following variables from our study due to lack of information: investment 
ratio of independent VC in seed stage (SEED_PE), financing amount from alliance before exit 
(ALLIANCE), existence of an alliance during the IT bubble period (alliance_99 _01_dummy), and 
existence of an alliance after the IT bubble (alliance_02_05_dummy). 
 
Dependent variables: 
Model 1: Biotech venture has gone public. 
Model 2: Biotech venture went public within five years after establishment. 
Model 3: Biotech venture merged or was acquired. 
 
Independent variables 
The definition of each independent and control variable is presented below. 
1. Foundation year was divided into three groups based on the trend as seen in Figure 10. This 
variable is also a control variable. 
− Founded before 1998 dummy  
− Founded between 1999 and 2007 dummy  
− Founded after 2008 dummy  
2. Log Finance 
Total funding amount until IPO or total funding amount until Dec. 8th, 2017 for private 
companies. 
3. Seed VC dummy 
Presence of funding from VCs at the seed round. 
4. Independent VC dummy 
Presence of funding by VCs which there is no dominant investor or shareholder in their 
ownership structure. 
5. Bank VC dummy 
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Presence of funding by VCs affiliated with banks, shinkin banksi, and credit union VCs. 
6. Government program dummy 
Presence of funding by government-affiliated financial institutions and/or VCs established and 
operated by the government and/or local government investments (e.g., New Energy and 
Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), Japan Agency for Medical 
Research and Development (AMED), Innovation Network Corporation of Japan (INCJ), and 
National Institute of Biomedical Innovation (NIBI)). 
7. SBIC dummy 
Presence of funding by the Small and Medium Business Investment Company (SBIC). 
8. University VC dummy 
Presence of funding by a VC established and operated by a university fund. 
9. Alliance collaboration with a pharmaceutical company 
Presence of a collaboration alliance on R&D with a pharmaceutical company. 
10. Out-licensing alliance to a pharmaceutical company 
Presence of a pipeline licensed out to a pharmaceutical company. 
 
Control variables 
11. Log Duration 
Control variables. Duration from establishment date to IPO or Dec. 8
th
, 2017 for private 
companies. 
SECTION 3. DATA SOURCE 
Primary data on biotech ventures characteristics was mainly from the website entrepedia 
(https://entrepedia.jp/en/home), and missing information was collected, to the extent possible, from 
                                                   
i
 Shinkin banks: They are cooperative regional financial institutions serving small and medium 
enterprises and local residents. 
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the Securities Registration Statement and/or the prospectus of securities for each company. 
Entrepedia is an online database of domestic startup companies operated by the Japan 
Venture Research (JVR), and includes detailed information on ventures, investors, and venture 
support, some of which are not available to the public as well as information on investment rounds, 
financing, business descriptions, funds, investment details, IPO data, etc. 
As a disclaimer, data on entrepedia is created from data on undisclosed venture companies 
registered in a database owned by JVR, and is updated daily based on user inputs. Databases include 
corporate homepages, official gazettes and securities reports, public information such as VC 
invested companies and public institutions, news published on media such as newspapers and 
magazines, websites, publicly accessible websites including Facebook and Twitter. It is created from 
information that entrepedia obtained from blogs, information gathered from websites of 
employment agency, information registered by companies through entrepedia that JVR believes to 
be reliable. Partly due to speculation by JVR, actual data may differ from what is registered on 
entrepedia. 
SECTION 4. RESEARCH POPULATION/SAMPLE 
The target population in this study is “ventures” as presented below. The following steps 
were taken before aggregating and analyzing the data. 
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Figure 9 
 
1. Total number of venture companies: 11,200 
1.1 Total number of public venture companies: 981 
1.2 Total number of private venture companies: 10,219 
2. Total number of companies that falls under “biotechnology” in the JVR industrial 
classification: 406 
These companies conduct business by utilizing "biotechnology" in the following industries.  
Drug discovery (research, production technology, equipment) / medical diagnosis / medical 
treatment biotechnology (interpersonal field) / agriculture · animal field biotechnology / industrial 
field biotechnology (biochemical products, bioprocess for food industry, pollution · hazardous waste 
bioprocess for countermeasures, bioprocess for recovery of petroleum) / biosensor / biotechnology 
related research · production equipment / biotechnology related research and service. 
 
There was no major difference in the definitions used as “industry of biotechnology" in 
Miyake et al. (2010), the definition of entrepedia, and the definition by JIS. 
 
3. Ventures: 377 
Companies with a headcount of fewer than 300, and that have been in operation for less than 
ALL: 11,200 
Total number of public venture companies: 981 
Total number of private venture companies: 
10,219 
JVR industry 
Bio technology: 406 
Ventures : 377 
Public: 37 
Private:327 
M&A:13  
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20 years among companies whose JVR industrial classification was “biotechnology.” 
SECTION 5. DATA ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Logistic regression analysis using the maximum likelihood method was applied to this 
analysis using Stata (version: Stata/IC 15.1 for Mac (64-bit Intel)). The version of Microsoft Excel 
for MAC 2011 used for the data preparation was 14.5.5 (150821). 
SECTION 6. SUMMARY 
This study was designed to investigate differences between the United States and Japan on 
success factors for biotech ventures from a financing and alliance formation perspective using a 
logistic regression analysis. The target population in this study is “ventures,” which is defined as a 
company with a headcount of fewer than 300 that has been in operation for less than 20 years, and 
that conducts business utilizing "biotechnology."  
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CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DATA, RESULT 
OF ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND INTERPRETATION 
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents details on the profiles of domestic biotech ventures and analyzes 
success factors for biotech ventures using a logistic regression analysis that was described in Section 
5 of Chapters 3.  
SECTION 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The profile of domestic biotech ventures is presented below. 
Japan biotech ventures by year of establishment 
Figure 10 shows the number of biotech ventures according to the year that they were 
established. It shows an increase from 1999; 334 companies were established in 2004, then it 
dropped to half or less from 2008 except for 2015.  
 
Figure 10 
 
Source: entrepedia 
Japan biotechnology IPO by year 
Figure 11 shows the number of biotech ventures that went public by year. Four companies 
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went public in 2011 and 2013, respectively. However, the trend has been declining since then. 
 
Figure 11 
 
Source: entrepedia 
Japan biotechnology M&A by year 
Figure 12 shows the number of biotech ventures that merged or were acquired by year. 
Three companies merged or were acquired in 2014 and 2015. However, the trend has been declining 
since then. 
 
Figure 12 
 
Source: entrepedia 
 
Total amount of finance 
Table 2 and Figure 13 shows the statistical analysis on the total funding amount for each 
model. The number of companies that reported the amount of funds raised was 370. The average of 
0
1
2
3
4
5
2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
m
p
a
n
y
 
Japan biotechnology IPO by year 
All IPO (n=37) IPO within 5 yrs (n=12)
0
1
2
3
4
2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2017
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
d
e
a
l 
Japan biotech company M&A by year (n=13) 
23 
 
total funding amount prior to an IPO for public biotech ventures, prior to an M&A for biotech 
ventures that merged or were acquired, and until Dec. 9
th
, 2017 for private companies was as 
follows: 0.896 billion yen (SD = 1.95×10
9
) for all ventures, 2.77 billion yen (SD = 2.85×10
9
) for all 
public companies, 1.23 billion yen (SD = 1.22×109) for companies that had gone public within five 
years of being established, and 2.04 billion yen (SD = 1.57×109) for companies that merged or were 
acquired. 
 
Table 2  Total funding amount 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All 370 0.896  1.95  0.00081  16.4  
IPO 35 2.77  2.85  0.00326  12.7 
IPO within 5 yrs 11 1.23  1.22  0.0322  3.7 
MA 13 2.04  1.57  0.271  5.4 
    
Unit: Billion yen 
 
Figure 13 
 
 
Types of investors 
Table 3 shows the frequency of investment by VCs, government program, and SBIC. The 
percentage of biotech ventures that received investment from VCs at the seed round was quite low, 
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which indicates that financing at the seed period for biotech ventures is still limited in Japan. 
 
Table 3  Frequency of investment by VCs, government program, and SBIC  
SEED VC Freq. % 
 
SBIC Freq. % 
0 358 96.24 
 
0 310 83.11 
1 14 3.76 
 
1 63 16.89 
Total 372 100 
 
Total 373 100 
       Independent VC  Freq. % 
 
University VC Freq. % 
0 233 62.63 
 
0 328 88.17 
1 139 37.37 
 
1 44 11.83 
Total 372 100 
 
Total 372 100 
       
Bank VC Freq. % 
 
Collaboration with a 
pharmaceutical company 
Freq. % 
0 244 65.42 
 
0 350 93.58 
1 129 34.58 
 
1 24 6.42 
Total 373 100 
 
Total 374 100 
       Government 
program 
Freq. % 
 
Out-licensing to a 
pharmaceutical company 
Freq. % 
0 306 82.04 
 
0 345 92.75 
1 67 17.96 
 
1 29 7.75 
Total 373 100 
 
Total 374 100 
 
 
The correlation of each independent variable 
Table 4 shows the correlation of each independent variable. There were no independent 
variables that were removed from the logistic regression analysis. 
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Table 4  The correlation of each independent variable   
  
Before 
1998s 
1999s- 
2007s 
After 
2008s Finance Duration 
SEED 
VC 
Founded before 1998s 1 
     Founded 1999s-2007s -0.1952 1 
    Founded after 2008s -0.1243 -0.9489 1 
   Log Finance 0.1171 0.3677 -0.4097 1 
  Log Duration 0.1185 0.7013 -0.7477 0.2459 1 
 SEED VC -0.0309 -0.1449 0.1566 0.0212 -0.2129 1 
Independent VC 0.0989 0.2275 -0.262 0.4963 0.1835 0.1914 
Bank VC 0.11 0.136 -0.1729 0.5228 0.0717 0.1747 
Government program 0.0163 0.0513 -0.0572 0.2461 -0.0019 0.0624 
SBIC 0.0701 0.3091 -0.3353 0.3285 0.1965 -0.0078 
University VC -0.004 0.092 -0.0918 0.2967 -0.0091 -0.0711 
Alliance collaboration 0.031 0.0518 -0.0624 0.2329 -0.0029 0.0713 
Alliance license out 0.0929 0.119 -0.1503 0.3269 0.0028 0.0037 
 
  Bank GOV SBIC UNIV 
Collabora
tion 
Out- 
license 
Bank VC 1 
     Government program 0.1892 1 
    SBIC 0.2373 0.131 1 
   University VC 0.295 0.1137 0.1309 1 
  Alliance collaboration 0.0996 0.2287 0.0942 0.1492 1 
 Alliance Out-license 0.1614 0.1732 0.2175 0.1953 0.3222 1 
SECTION 3. RESULTS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
A logistic regression analysis was performed to evaluate the overall predictability of the 
selected variables listed in Table 1 in Section 2.  
Table 5 shows the output of the logistic regression analysis for Models 1, 2, and 3. 
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Table 5  Result of the logistic regression analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES 
Biotech venture has 
gone public 
Biotech venture 
went public within 
five years after 
establishment. 
Biotech venture 
merged or was 
acquired. 
Founded before 1998s dummy 8.510*** 6.485** - 
 
(1.898) (2.555) - 
Founded 1999s 2007s dummy 4.888*** 3.063* 1.744 
 
(1.427) (1.698) (1.344) 
Log Finance 0.161 0.0938 0.520** 
 
(0.183) (0.234) (0.237) 
Log Duration -2.781*** -3.177*** -1.049 
 
(0.693) (0.979) (0.669) 
SEED VC dummy -0.445 0.819 0.874 
 
(1.282) (1.785) (1.422) 
Independent VC dummy 0.300 -0.516 0.0350 
 
(0.642) (1.102) (0.710) 
Bank dummy 1.884** 0.794 -0.926 
 
(0.753) (1.169) (0.832) 
Government dummy -0.0407 1.815* 0.939 
 
(0.656) (0.964) (0.696) 
SBIC dummy -0.944 -2.442* -0.141 
 
(0.736) (1.290) (0.774) 
University dummy 0.523 1.227 0.904 
 
(0.679) (1.079) (0.795) 
Alliance collaboration 1.973** 0.691 -0.259 
 
(0.802) (1.085) (0.939) 
Alliance out-licensing 2.937*** 3.648*** 0.467 
 
(0.710) (1.295) (0.819) 
Constant -5.595 -4.133 -12.95*** 
 
(3.465) (4.408) (4.752) 
Observations 361 361 352 
LR chi2 120.43 41.25 24.43 
Degree of freedom 12 12 11 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  
In Model 3, Founded before 1998 dummy = 0 predicts failure perfectly and nine observations were not used. 
 
4.3.1. Model 1: Biotech venture has gone public 
The number of observations was 361 since those with missing values for any variable were 
excluded from the regression analysis.  
The likelihood ratio chi-square of 120.43 with a p-value of 0.0000 indicates that this model 
is statistically significant. In this case, there were 12 degrees of freedom and the pseudo R-squared 
was 0.5571.  
The coefficient for the Founded before 1998 dummy variable and the Founded between 
1999-2007 dummy variable was 8.510 and 4.888, respectively. The standard errors were 1.898 and 
1.427, respectively, and were positively significant at the 1% level.  
Figure 14 shows the timing of the IPO. Twelve out of fourteen biotech ventures that did not 
form an alliance with a pharmaceutical company went public after at least one product/service had 
been launched. Since the probability of success of developing the product/service is declining in the 
biotechnology industry as described in Section 2 of Chapter 1, I conclude that biotech ventures 
established after 2007 are less likely to achieve an IPO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Pseudo R2 0.5571 0.4898 0.2333 
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Figure 14 
 
The coefficient for the Bank VC variable was 1.884, the standard error was 0.753, and it was 
positively significant at the 5% level. Thus, bank VCs invest in biotech ventures that have a high 
probability of a positive return on investment. 
The coefficient for the variable on collaboration with pharmaceutical companies was 1.973, 
the standard error was 0.802, and it was positively significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficient for the variable on out-licensing to pharmaceutical companies was 2.937, the 
standard error was 0.710, and it was positively significant at the 1% level.  
An alliance with a pharmaceutical company provides biotech companies with funds for 
R&D both before and after an IPO. In particular, out-licensing provides upfront and milestone 
payments without funding concerns at each development stage and a royalty payment if the 
product/service is launched successfully. Thus, I conclude that securing financing for the post-IPO 
period is an important factor to lead biotech ventures to IPOs.  
4.3.2. Model 2: Biotech venture went public within five years after establishment   
The number of observations was 361, and the likelihood ratio chi-square of 41.25 with a 
p-value of 0.0000 indicates that this model is statistically significant. In this case, there were 12 
degrees of freedom and the pseudo R-squared was 0.4898.  
The coefficient for the Founded before 1998 dummy variable was 6.485, the standard error 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Research
Pre-clinical
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Launch
Timing of IPO 
No Alliance (n=14) Collaboration only (n=3) Out-License (n=20)
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was 2.555, and it was positively significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for the Founded between 
1999 and 2007 dummy variable was 3.063, the standard error was 1.698, and it was positively 
significant at the 10% level. Interpretation from this result is the same as for Model 1. 
The coefficient for the government program variable was 1.815, the standard error was 
0.964, and it was positively significant at the 10% level. Government programs invested in biotech 
ventures that had a high probability of a positive return on investment within five years after 
establishment. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for SBIC was -2.442, the standard error was 1.290, and it 
was negatively significant at the 10% level. This result indicates that SBIC invested in high-risk 
biotech ventures. 
The coefficient for out-licensing to pharmaceutical companies was 3.648, the standard error 
was 1.295, and it was positively significant at the 1% level. This result supports the idea that 
securing financing for the post-IPO period is an important factor to lead biotech ventures to an IPO.
 
4.3.3. Model 3: Biotech ventures merged or was acquired  
The number of observations was 352, and the likelihood ratio chi-square of 24.43 with a 
p-value of 0.0003 indicates that this model is statistically significant. In this case, there were 11 
degrees of freedom and the pseudo R-squared was 0.2333. There was no independent variable that 
significantly affected the dependent variable.  
SECTION 4. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
This section discusses the analysis and offers insights mainly on differences between the 
Unites States and Japan on success factors for biotech ventures from a finance and alliance 
formation perspective. I also discuss the underlying reasons behind the differences. The results 
should be interpreted subjected to the limitations discussed in Section 5 of this chapter. 
The success factor for IPOs that is seen in Japan as well as in the United States is to form an 
alliance with a pharmaceutical company, especially through an out-licensing agreement, which was 
the strongest factor that led biotech ventures to an IPO in Japan. Out-licensing increases the 
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probability of success of developing products/services with sufficient funds and knowledgeable 
human resources. As described in Section 3 of this chapter, upfront payments, milestone payments, 
and royalty payments from a pharmaceutical company are steady incomes for biotech ventures. 
Considering that it takes time for the biotechnology to become profitable, and because it is difficult 
to raise enough funding for development and growth through an IPO, ventures need to secure 
income sources for the post-IPO period prior to the IPO. Therefore, they should wait to go public 
until at least one product/service has been launched, or an alliance with a pharmaceutical company 
has been formed, or unless they have another business division that can generate revenues prior to 
the IPO. 
A criterion for success for IPOs, which is not seen in Japan, but is in the United States is the 
total funding amount since large amounts of financing allows biotech ventures in the United States 
to advance R&D activities without restrictions, increase market capitalization, and go public as a 
means to raise greater financing for further development. However, according to Honjo et al.,
(13)
 
increasing the number of investment rounds and VCs did not increase market capitalization of 
biotech ventures in Japan and thus does not motivate biotech ventures to go public. Furthermore, 
according to Figure 14, biotech ventures which signed an out-licensing agreement with a 
pharmaceutical company went public regardless of the development stage without waiting for the 
launch of a product/service. Thus, the total amount of investment may not be a significant factor that 
leads to IPOs in Japan. 
The performances of government programs and SBIC investments were different between 
the United States and Japan. The results showed that Japanese government programs did not invest 
in biotech ventures whose risks were too high for other investors to invest in, and instead invested in 
ventures that have a high probability of a positive return on investment within five years after its 
establishment. The SBIC in Japan, which was established to encourage the management of small 
businesses, invests in biotech ventures whose risks are high. This result was in contrast with the 
performance of government programs and SBIC investments in the United States. 
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SECTION 5. LIMITATION OF THE ANALYSIS 
According to Figure 1, there were about 550 biotech ventures in Japan. However, the 
number of companies captured in the entrepedia website used in this study was only 377 companies. 
The main limitation of this study is the limited information on private companies. Thus, there is a 
possibility of selection bias among the listed companies on entrepedia. 
Although this may affect the results, the main objectives of this study are to investigate the 
difference between the Unites State and Japan in success factors to go public or be involved in an 
M&A from the finance and alliance formation perspective. 
This limitation is caused by a lack of information on private companies. Thus, it is not an 
issue that applies only to Japan. Hence, although information on private companies is limited and 
possibly biased, I consider it sufficient for the purposes of this study. 
SECTION 6. SUMMARY 
The results show that out-licensing was the strongest factor that led biotech ventures to go 
public in Japan as well as for the United States. The likely reason is because out-licensing provides 
an income source not only before the IPO, but also after, which reduces their concerns for delisting 
and allows them to go public even though it takes time for biotechnology firms to become 
profitable.  
Secondly, the total funding amount did not make a significant difference on IPO likelihood 
in Japan in contrast with the United States. This is because increasing the number of investment 
rounds and VCs did not increase the market capitalization of domestic biotech ventures. As a result, 
it did not motivate biotech ventures to undertake IPOs. 
Thirdly, the performances of government programs and SBIC investments were different 
between the United States and Japan. The results showed that Japanese government programs did 
not invest in biotech ventures whose risks were too high for other investors to invest in, and instead 
invested in ventures that have a high probability of a positive return on investment within five years 
after establishment. SBIC investments in Japan, which was established to encourage the 
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management of small businesses, invested in biotech ventures whose risks are high. This result was 
in contrast with the performance of government programs and SBIC investments in the United 
States. 
Finally, biotech ventures established after 2007 were less likely to go public IPO since the 
probability of success of developing a product/service is declining in the biotechnology industry, 
and VCs invest in biotech ventures sometime after the seed round (around 35%). However, there 
was no significant difference in the exit strategy of biotech ventures. 
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CHAPTER 5. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The results in Chapter 4 showed that out-licensing was the strongest factor that led biotech 
ventures to IPOs in Japan, and the likely reason was because it provides post-IPO financing.  
 This chapter further discusses the issue of post-IPO financing in Japan and corporate 
performance after an IPO to gain more insights on this idea. 
SECTION 1. REVIEW OF THE METI REPORT 
According to a report by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),
(14)
 the 
average negative profit period of a US biotech venture is reported as 10.2 years, and institutional 
investors and others raise an average of 40 billion yen per company even during a period of negative 
profits after an IPO. Figure 15 shows that post-IPO financing is about five times more than pre-IPO 
in the United States. Biotech ventures in the United States go public at an early development stage. 
Thus, a large amount of funding is required after the IPO. On the other hand, in Japan, the amount 
of financing after an IPO is much smaller than that in the United States. Thus, I consider the 
possibility that the post-IPO financing environment may be not sufficient in Japan. 
Figure 15 
 
Source: The Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (2017)  
  
According to the METI report, in the United States, although biotech ventures are generally 
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considered to be high-risk high-return companies, there have been many cases of successful 
investments in biotech ventures. Therefore, there are many crossover investors (e.g., institutional 
investors) who understand the industrial characteristics of the negative profit period that lies ahead, 
and there are many index funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) that provide funds needed after 
an IPO.  
On the other hand, in Japan, there are few successful biotech ventures and few institutional 
investors and analysts who understand the industrial characteristics and can properly evaluate the 
corporate values of private biotech ventures and make long-term investments. Furthermore, index 
funds and ETFs do not yet exist. The government proposes to accelerate fund circulation in the 
listed market by creating success stories in bio venture investments in Japan, attracting institutional 
investor attention, and promoting further investments in these ventures.  
The Future Investment Strategy 2017
(15)
 advocates for the establishment of funds, which 
would enable domestic biotech ventures to raise financing from domestic and foreign investors 
sustainably after an IPO, and improve the business environment to create innovative drugs in Japan. 
SECTION 2. REVIEW OF DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDS FOR DELISTING BETWEEN 
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Standards for delisting based on sales/corporate performance listed on the homepage of 
Japan Exchange Group (JEG)
(16)
 are presented below:  
 
I. Sales in Mothers domestic stocks 
Sales figures for the last business year is less than ¥ 100 million (excluding cases in which 
the amount of profit is recorded). This excludes the first five years after listing. 
 
II. Corporate performance in JASDAQ domestic stocks 
The operating income and the cash flow in operating activities for the four most recent 
consolidated fiscal years are negative, and this state is not resolved within one year. For a company 
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listed on JASDAQ Growth, this excludes cases where the four most recent consolidated fiscal years 
include the five fiscal years prior to the fiscal year following that in which the company made its 
listing application (i.e., excluding JASDAQ Growth-listed companies in the first consolidated fiscal 
year following that of the listing application). 
 
On the other hand, there is no standard for delisting based on sales/corporate performance in 
the NASDAQ.  
I suggest that the post-IPO financing environment is not satisfactory in Japan. There are 
standards for delisting based on sales/corporate performance so that biotech ventures go public only 
after securing revenue for the post-IPO period prior to an IPO. As a result, it causes a slowdown in 
the development speed of innovative drugs. 
SECTION 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA USED IN THIS STUDY 
In this section, we review the post-IPO financing that biotech ventures obtain prior to an 
IPO and the corporate performance. 
Of the 37 public companies, 20 companies signed an out-licensing agreement with a 
pharmaceutical company, 3 companies signed a joint development agreement with a pharmaceutical 
company, 12 companies had at least one product/service in market, and 2 companies had another 
business division that was profitable. 
 
Corporate Performance 
Of the 37 public companies, 24 biotech ventures (65%) had positive net income at least 
once. The breakdown of the 24 ventures is 10 ventures (83%, out of 12 biotech ventures) with a 
marketed products/service, 11 ventures (55%, out of 20 ventures) with an out-licensing agreement, 3 
ventures (100%, out of 3 ventures) with a collaboration development agreement, and 0 ventures (out 
of 2 ventures) that had another business division that was profitable.  
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Table 6  Percentage of companies which had positive net profit 
 
Out-licensing 
(n=20) 
Collaboration only 
(n=3) 
Marketed 
products/service 
(n=12) 
Another business 
division that was 
profitable (n=2) 
Positive net 
profit 
11 
(55%) 
3 
(100%) 
10 
(83%) 
0 
(0%) 
Source: The Securities Registration Statement and the prospectus of securities for each company 
 
Delisted companies 
As of December 29, 2017, two companies had been delisted, of which one had an 
out-licensing agreement and the other had another business division that was profitable. 
SECTION 4. SUMMARY 
There are few successful biotech ventures in Japan. As a result, there are few crossover 
investors (e.g., institutional investors) and analysts who understand the industrial characteristics of 
the negative profit period that lies ahead, can properly evaluate corporate values and make 
long-term investments after the biotech venture’s IPO. 
Additionally, there are standards for delisting based on sales/corporate performance in Japan, 
which does not exist in the United States. Therefore, domestic biotech ventures only go public after 
forming an alliance with a pharmaceutical company or launching at least one product/service to 
secure income to avoid being delisted. These differences are hindering IPOs at an early development 
stage and accelerating fund circulation in the listed market. As a result, it slows the development of 
the most advanced therapeutic drugs in Japan. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTION 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, as well as present recommendations 
and suggestions for further work. 
SECTION 1. CONCLUSIONS 
The results showed that 1) out-licensing is the strongest factor that leads to biotech venture 
IPOs in Japan as well as in the United States, 2) total funding amount has no significant impact on 
the likelihood of an IPO of biotech ventures in Japan, which contrasts with the United States. This is 
because increasing the number of investment rounds and VCs do not increase market capitalization 
and thus does not motivate biotech ventures to go public, 3) the Japanese government programs 
does not invest in biotech ventures whose risks are too high for other investors to invest in, and 
instead invests in ventures that have a high probability of a positive return on investment within five 
years after establishment. On the other hand, SBIC invests in high risk companies, which is in 
contrast with the United States, 4) VCs invest in biotech ventures sometime after the seed round, 
however there was no significant difference in the exit strategy of biotech ventures, and 5) biotech 
ventures established after 2007 are less likely to go public.  
Moreover, based on the results, I suggest that the post-IPO financing environment is not 
sufficient in Japan even though there is a delisting standards on sales/corporate performance. There 
are only a few successful biotech ventures in Japan. As a result, there are few institutional investors 
and analysts who understand the industrial characteristics of the negative profit period that lies 
ahead, can properly evaluate the corporate values, and make investments in the long-term after a 
biotech venture goes public. 
The weak post-IPO financing environment and the delisting standards are preventing IPOs 
at an early development stage. As a result, this slows down the development of the most advanced 
therapeutic drugs in Japan.  
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SECTION 2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To accelerate the development of the most advanced therapeutic drugs in Japan, I 
recommend improving the post-IPO financing environment in Japan, which encourages biotech 
ventures to go public earlier and raise funds by an IPO when they need funds to speed up the 
development of drugs. 
In November 2017, METI announced the establishment of a study group to undertake 
“dialogue guidance” and organize “issues of listed markets” to build a post-IPO investment chain 
for biotech ventures from establishment to post-IPO, and accelerate the creation of success cases in 
Japan. Specifically, the study group is proposing concrete measures to relax the delisting criteria and 
establish an environment for post-IPO financing investments for biotech ventures. 
SECTION 3. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
As described in Section 5 of Chapter 4, the main limitation of this study is the limited 
information on private companies, which could imply that there was a selection bias in the studied 
firms. In terms of future research, if a database with a higher coverage rate of registered ventures 
could be created, I recommend carrying out the analysis using such a database. The results would be 
more reliable in supporting future discussions. 
SECTION 4. SUMMARY 
This study investigates differences between the United States and Japan on the success 
factors for biotech ventures from a financing and alliance formation perspective using a logistic 
regression analysis. Based on the study results, I conclude that the weak post-IPO financing 
environment and delisting standards are hindering IPOs at the early development stage, and slowing 
down the development of the most advanced therapeutic drugs in Japan. 
Finally, I recommend improving the post-IPO financing in Japan to encourage biotech 
ventures to go public earlier and raise required funds through an IPO to speed up development of 
innovative drugs.  
39 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to my thesis advisor, Associate 
Professor, Nobuhiko HIBARA of the Graduate school business and finance at Waseda University. 
Whenever I asked him some advice, the door to Associate Prof. HIBARA office was always open 
and he respected my opinion and led me in the right direction. 
 
Moreover I would like to thank Professor Mitsuru IWAMURA of the Graduate school 
business and finance at Waseda University as the Deputy Examiner of this thesis, for his very 
valuable comments on this thesis. I gratefully acknowledge support and comments from my present 
members of HIBARA seminar.   
40 
 
 
REFERENCES 
                                                   
(1)
 Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (2017), DATA BOOK 2017  
(2)
 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2013), “The Pharmaceutical Industry Vision 2013” 
(3)
 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2017), “Health labor white paper 2017” 
(4)
 Henry W. Chesbrough (2003), “The Era of Open Innovation”, MIT Sloan Management 
Review SPRING 2003 VOL.44 NO.3 
(5)
 Japan Bioindustry Association (2015), “Bio Venture Statistics Survey Report in 2015”  
(6)
 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2010), “Bio-innovation study report 2010” 
(7)
 Ernst & Young Global Biotechnology Report (2017), “Beyond borders” 
(8)
 Public interest Foundation Japan Institute of Securities and Economics Research Institute 
for Financial Products Commerce (2013), “Change in securities regulation by US JOBS Act”  
(9)
 Y. Urakawa (2015) "15
th
 Industry Eye Life science/health care: Biotechnology industry - 
Japan-US bio ventures, Current situation and challenges of future, and future potential ", 
Deloitte Tohmatsu Financial Advisory LLC 
(10)
 Venture Enterprise Center (2016), “Venture Enterprise Center YEARBOOK 2016” 
(11)
 T. Yagi, M. Ohkubo (2013), “Duration and cost of drug development - Survey on actual 
condition by questionnaire”, Pharmaceutical Industry Policy Research Institute Research 
Paper Series July 2013 No.59 
(12)
 Y. Miyake, K. Motohashi (2010), “Quantitative analysis of success factors of US biotech 
ventures”, Master thesis of the department of Technology Management for Innovation at the 
University of Tokyo 
(13)
 Y. Honjo et al (2015), “Initial public offering of BioStartup and financing”, Hitotsubashi 
University Institute of Inovation Research Working Paper WP#15-01 
(14)
 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2017), “The current status and issues of 
the biotech ventures” 
(15)
 Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization (2017), “ Future Investment Strategy 
2017”, Cabinet Public Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat  
(16) Japan Exchange Group (2017), http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/delisting/  
